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REPLY TO CROSS-APPELLANTfS OPENING BRIEF
The Cross-Appellant (hereinafter "Orlob") argues that the judgment of the District
Court below should be reversed, in part, because (1) it fails to apply a doctrine of
"practical construction;" and (2) there is no "substantial evidence" to support the District
Court's determination that Orlob is only entitled to fifty percent of the amounts which
would otherwise be due to him under the terms of the Combined Agreement in this case.
The "practical construction" argument urged by Orlob, in fact, supports a greater award
to Jensens and, in any event, it is unnecessary to reach any such argument because, for
the reasons stated in the Brief of Appellant's (hereinafter "Jensen" or "Jensens1"), Orlob
may not recover in this case as a matter of law.
As to the "substantial evidence" argument, while it is true that the Court did not
cite any evidence from the record in determining Orlobfs entitlement to fifty percent of
the payments under the contract, there is substantial evidence that Orlob, personally,
should not have been awarded an amount anywhere near 50% of the payments even if he
had not been in clear breach of his obligations and warranties. Finally, the correct result
would have given Orlob nothing because of his breaches of the contract.
I.

ALTHOUGH "PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION" IS NOT
REQUIRED, THE APPLICATION OF "PRACTICAL
CONSTRUCTION" IN THIS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT
ORLOBfS ARGUMENT

Orlob suggests that the Trial Court was required as a matter of law to adopt what
he says is the "practical construction" of the contract placed on it by the parties
Pagel

themselves. This means, in Orlob's view, lhat the Court had no discretion to award only a
portion of any amount otherwise due under the contract to Orlob, but was required to
award all such amounts to Orlob. The "practical construction" argument proposed by
Orlob is designed for use by the trial court. The test on appeal is whether the trial court
committed "clear error". Burge v. Facio, 88 P.3d 350, 352 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Orlobfs
argument completely ignores, not only the contract language, but also the admissions by
Orlob, the "practical" reasons for the method of contract payments, and the manner in
which the parties in fact dealt with payments due under the contract. It also ignores the
express determination of the Trial Court that Orlob breached his personal warranties and
covenants under the Combined Agreement.
The objective of contract construction is to determine the intent of the parties at
the time of contracting. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d
910 (Utah 1965). However, Orlob testified that the parties never had any agreement or
even discussion of the question of who would be the payee on the checks. Trial Tr., June
25,2002, p. 153. Orlob now asks this Court to apply the concept of "practical
construction" to the fact that Orlob, personally, was the payee. However, Orlob's own
testimony demonstrates that no construction, practical, or otherwise, will lead to a finding
that the parties "agreed" that Orlob was entitled to 100% or any other percentage of the
payments.
There is a better and more probable explanation in the record for Orlob!s name
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appearing on the checks. Kenneth Jensen, the father, testified under questions from
Orlob's counsel, that it was their understanding that payments were to be made to PC G.
(Trial Tr., June 25, 2002, p. 48). During the transition, Orlob assigned his corporation's
(PCG) checking account to Jensens. Steve Jensen, who wrote the checks, testified that all
checks to Orlob were writtenfromthe PCG account and for that reason were made
payable to Orlob personally. (Trial Tr., June 25,2002. P. 58.) This testimony is
uncontradicted. Thus, the "practical construction" urged by Orlob does not support his
proposed outcome, but, helps reveal the "practical" reason of not having PCG the payee
on a PCG check.
The Court found that Orlob breached his agreement to deliver Dr. Hamilton as a
physician willing to pay a six percent commission to the Jensens. (FF 16) Further, the
Court found that Orlob breached his agreement not to compete directly or indirectly with
the Jensens as to at least Dr. Peterson. (FF 19) Finally, the Court also found that Orlob
breached his covenant to assist in the transfer and maintenance of accounts to the extent
that he did not introduce the Jensens to certain Payson physicians. (CL 3) Moreover, the
recotd is clear that Orlob did not do anything at all after the first six months with respect
to his warranty that he would assist the Jensens in maintaining the transferred accounts
"over the life of the agreement". (Trial Tr., June 25,2005, p. 137.) As to the breach with
respect to Dr. Peterson, the Court determined the Jensens "elected a fair and appropriate
remedy" by reducing the amount of the commissions payable to Orlob. (CL 4)
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The key to the Court's ruling is that the parties did not themselves impose any
"practical construction" on the contract pursuant to which Orlob received either all of the
commission payments due, or none of them. Thus, the Utah cases cited by Orlob stand
only for the proposition that Utah courts are permitted to take into account the parties1
conduct when interpreting an agreement. Utah law does not support Orlobfs position that
the Trial Court had no discretion, under a nebulous "practical construction'5 doctrine, to
award Orlob only a portion of the commissions to which he is claims to be otherwise
entitled.
Nor is the "practical construction" doctrine as rigid a formula as Orlob would have
the Court believe. In Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 97 P.3d 697 (Utah Ct.
App. 2004), for example, this Court, faced with the construction of a real property deed,
stated "[wjhere the provisions of a deed are doubtful the court may also look to the
practical construction placed upon the instrument," id. at 703. (Emphasis supplied.) The
Court of Appeals emphasized that it's use of the word "may" in its analysis suggests that
the trial court is granted discretion to consider such factors, but that considering such
factors is certainly not required. Id. See also Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Lambert,
642 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1982) ("[e]ven more important here is the rule that if there is
inconsistency or doubt about the language used in a document, the practical construction
placed on it, as shown by the actions of the parties, should be given consideration, and
may be regarded as persuasive.") Orlob's insistence that the "practical construction"
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doctrine must berigidlyapplied is thus misplaced.
II.

WHILE ORLOB IS CORRECT IN ASSERTING THAT NO
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURTS
DETERMINATION TO AWARD HIM FIFTY PERCENT OF
AMOUNTS PAYABLE THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTING A MUCH
SMALLER OR ZERO ALLOCATION TO ORLOB,
ADDITIONALLY, THE CORRECT RESULT IS TO AWARD
NOTHING TO ORLOB BECAUSE OF HIS BREACHES OF
THE CONTRACT.

What Orlob leaves out of his argument that he should get 100% of the payments is
the substantial body of trial evidence that demonstrate that the assets for which Jensens
were paying came from the Corporation and were not primarily designed to pay for
Orlob's personal services and covenants. Moreover, the uncontradicted evidence and the
trial court's findings show that Orlob breached all his personal covenants and warranties.
First, the Jensens were buying corporate assets. The evidence shows that the bulk of the
payments were for purchase of PCG's assets, not for Orlob's personal services and
covenants. For example:
(1) Orlob wanted to move to California. Although the Court of Appeals in the
earlier appeal on summary judgment motions stated that Orlob's personal interest in the
payments was supported by his covenant against competition, this statement was made
without the benefit of the evidence at trial demonstrating that at the time of sale everyone
knew that Orlob was moving to California:
Q. Did you, at some point make a determination to contact the Jensens?
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A. Yes I did. I was interested in moving to California and interested in
selling the business.
Q. And do you recall having negotiations with the Jensens concerning
selling your business to them?
A. Yes I do.
* * *

Q. Do you recall during those negotiations whether the topic of you moving
to California was discussed.
A. Yes.
(Trial Tr., June 25, 2002 p. 173; Appellants Addendum, Tab D. p 73.)
A covenant against competition dealing with Utah doctors is of limited value
because of Orlob's imminent move to California. This is a fact known to all the parties at
the time of contracting and to the Trial Court below, but not known to the Court of
Appeals at the time of the earlier appeal.
(2) Orlob did not believe that he had any personal claim to payments from
Jensens when he filed for personal bankruptcy. When Orlob filed his personal
bankruptcy in 1992, he prepared schedules showing all his personal assets and liabilities.
(Addendum, Tab D p . 141, See Ex. 31; Addendum, Tab G.) Although Orlob claims in
this appeal that he is entitled, personally, to hundreds of thousands of dollars, from
Jensens, he did not even mention the claim to such dollars in his bankruptcy schedules.
(Addendum, Tab D, p. 143: 18-25 and Tab G.) This shows that his putative belief in a
"personal" claim to the payments arose after 1992.
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(3) Orlob's trial testimony demonstrates that the payments were due to the
corporation. Orlob's sworn testimony, cited below, constitutes an admission that the
payments under the "combined agreement" were to be payments to the corporation PCG,
not to himself personally. In 1990 the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") levied on the
payments Jensens were making under the combined agreement.. This IRS levy was for
delinquent taxes owed by PCG, not by Orlob personally Id. {See also FF 21, Addendum
Tab C). Orlob's sworn testimony below regarding the IRS levy demonstrates that he and
Jensens understood that the Jensens' payments were for the corporation, not for Orlob
personally.
Q. And is it your position that the Jensens and/or the corporation was
wrong in paying over the Internal Revenue Service the amounts that they
levied under the combined agreement?
A. My understanding with the Jensens was that the IRS was going to seize
the contract. That the Jensens would make payment to clear it and deduct it
from future payments.
(Trial Tr., June 25,2002, pp. 135-36.)
Accordingly, in 1990, Orlob and the Jensens agreed that the payments under the
combined agreement were payable to the corporation, PCG — and not to Orlob
personally — and should be used to satisfy an IRS levy against the corporation. This
"understanding" was reached before the arguments presently being made by Orlob were
framed and fully support a "practical construction" that the payments under the combined
agreement were "understood" by the parties to be completely, or at least largely, payable
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to the corporation rather than to Orlob personally.
(4) The intrinsic value of what Jensens purchased supports having the greatest
proportion of payments allocated to the corporation not to Orlob personally. The
Jensens' business and the business of PCG were the same: doing billing for
anesthesiologists. All the contracts being transferred to Jensens were owned by PCG, and
not Orlob personally. (Addendum, Tab D, p. 110.) The combined agreement makes it
clear that the "commissions" to be paid by the Jensens were for "collections for all
anesthesiologists fOrlobf can turn over to Jensens" (the term "Orlob" is defined in the
Combined Agreement to refer to and include PCG), see Combined Agreement,
Addendum A, p. 1.
The Jensens purchased all of the assets of the corporation. (Trial Tr. June 25,
2002, p. 123-24.) This included desks, chairs, employees and goodwill of the corporation.
(Trial Tr. June 25, 2002, p. 118.) Orlob testified that the Jensens wanted the eight
well-trained employees, that it would take at least six months to get somebody up to
speed, and that this was a well oiled machine that could basically run on its own. (Trial
Tr. June 25, 2002, p. 120.)
Thus, contrary to his arguments in this appeal that he, personally, should get 100%
of the payments, Orlob testified at trial to the enormous value of the corporation's assets
to the Jensens.
(5) Orlob breached all his personal covenants and warranties. Although the
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covenant against competition was of dubious value to Jensens because of Or!
known and imminent move to California, there were other personal covenants and
warranties by Orlob, personally, that had enormous value to the Jensens: (a) Orlob
warranted that he would assist in the "maintenance of the accounts over the life of the
agreement" (Combined Agreement, Addendum A, f 5.) In fact, however, although he
warranted to maintain the accounts for the life of the agreement, Orlob had no further
involvement in maintenance of the accounts after the first six months. (Trial Tr., June 25,
2005, p. 137.) Further, he also warranted that the tra^
"willing to pay 6% of total collections for services re

*th warranties

great value and both were breached. See Brief of Appellants, pp. 28-39.
Thus, despite the facts that (a) Orlob breached all his personal warranto
covenants (including the covenant not to compete); (b) Oriob's own testimony
that the corporate assets being purchased had great value; and (c) Orlob
proves that payments were designed to be paid to the corporation, not to Orlob
personally, Orlob argues on this appeal that he should get 100% of the payments. His
current arguments defy his own sworn testimony, violate the agreement of f
contradict the findings of the trial court, are contrary to the "practical construct;
which he argues, fly in the face of Utah law, and upset basic common sense.
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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF
III.

THE JENSENS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR ARGUMENTS
REGARDING ORLOB'S FAILURES TO DISCLOSE IN HIS
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING.

Orlob asserts, with no citation to the record, that the Trial Court concluded that the
Jensens had "waived" their arguments that he may not maintain this action based upon
his conduct in his personal bankruptcy proceeding. (Appellee's Brief at 18.) The Trial
Court did refuse to accept the Jensens' arguments on this issue, but the basis for that
rejection is not clear from the record, and the Jensens' arguments with respect to this issue
simply go unaddressed in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(Apellants' Addendum, Tab C.) However, Orlob is correct that the Jensens filed a
post-trial memorandum based on clear evidence in the record arguing that, as a matter of
law, Orlob could not maintain this proceeding, essentially for the reasons stated in the
Jensens' opening brief, and that the Trial Court struck the memorandum.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLINING TO ALLOW
THE JENSENS TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF HIS FAILURES
TO SCHEDULE ANY INTEREST IN THE COMBINED
AGREEMENT OR THE INSTANT LITIGATION IN HIS
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING.

Orlob asserts that the Jensens should not be permitted to raise his fraud because it
was not in the pleadings. However, no evidence regarding the extent of Orlob's
bankruptcyfraudwas available until Orlob himself testified about his failures to properly
schedule his assets at trial on June 26,2002. See Brief ofAppellant; Addendum E.
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Orlob asserts that at trial, the Jensens1 "theory of relevancy" was that Orlob's own
view of the value of his interest in the Combined Agreement had no value (R. 1403), and
that the Court could not consider the admission of the bankruptcy statements and
schedules for any other purpose. Understandably, Orlob cites no case in support of this
startling proposition. To begin with, Orlob does not dispute that the bankruptcy
statements and schedules (Exhibit 31) were admitted by the Court over his objection, (R.
1681, p. 156) and cites nothing in the record restricting the scope for which those
documents were received. Nor were there any such limitations. Obviously, if the Court
has concerns about whether to admit documents only for some limited purpose, the Court
is free do so in its discretion. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130,
1149 (Utah 2001).
Inexplicably, however, and despite having admitted the bankruptcy statements and
schedules for all purposes, the Court did not allow the Jensens to argue the bankruptcy
issues in post-trial briefs. This is particularly troubling in light of the fact that Orlob's
failures to disclose his interest in the Combined Agreement in his bankruptcy case
amounted to a fraud on the Court, see, e.g., Tenn-Fla Partners v. First Union National
Bank (In re Tenn-Fla Partners), 226 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 2000); In re V&MManagement,
Inc., 215 B.R. 895 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); In re Michaelson, 141 B.R. 715, 716 (Bankr.
E. D. Cal. 1992) and defeats the jurisdiction of the Trial Court to award him any damages
herein. (See Jensens1 opening brief at pp. 14-16.)
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While the Jensens believe the jurisdictional question must be resolved in their
favor and is dispositive, even if the fraud on the bankruptcy court is not deemed
jurisdictional, this Court has broad authority to raise the issue sua sponte and to reverse
the District Court. See, e.g., Weber County v. Chambers, 28 P.3d 694, 696 (Utah 2001);
Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171,186 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
This inherent equitable power existed at common law. In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944), the United
States Supreme Court noted the tension between the rule that judgments are final and the
"rule of equity... that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered
fraud, relief will be granted.11 Id. at 244, 64 S.Ct. at 1000. This equitable rule was
"fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting injustices." Id. It should
be exercised cautiously, but when the occasion demands, the power has been wielded
"without hesitation" and equity can be interposed to "devitalize [ ] ... judgments]." Id. at
245, 64 S.Ct. 997 at 1001.
B,

THE JENSENS HAVE NOT WAIVED THE BANKRUPTCY
FRAUD DEFENSE BY FAILING TO RAISE IT UNTIL
TRIAL.

Without any analysis, Orlob asserts that the case of Keller v. Southwood North
Medical Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998), is controlling on this issue. In Keller,
the Court notes that a statute of limitations defense is waived if not raised in a responsive
pleading or motion. Id. at 106. Here, the discovery of Orlob's fraud on the bankruptcy
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court did not occur until long after this case was filed by him and answered by the
Jensens. This is because Orlob did not file his bankruptcy until the year after he filed the
instant case. Indeed, until the trial in 2002, there was nothing before the Court which
would have demonstrated Orlob's fraud. Orlob's failures to report his interest in PCG and
his causes of action to the bankruptcy court are jurisdictional, as the Jensens noted in
their opening brief. The Keller case is distinguishable because in the context of civil
cases, statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional, James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 957 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998), and are expressly required to be raised affirmatively by Utah R. Civ. P. 8.
There is no requirement in Rule 8 that Orlob's fraud on the court be raised by affirmative
defense.
The matters which Orlob concealed from the Bankruptcy Court were the very
issues — his own causes of action — before the Court here. Those undisclosed causes of
action were the entire subject matter of this case. It is hornbook law that subject matter
jurisdiction may not only not be waived, but may be raised at any time. See, e.g., Bernard
v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993).
Further, as noted above, even assuming Orlob's fraud on the bankruptcy court is
not deemed jurisdictional, this Court has the inherent power to correct that fraud and
reverse the judgment in favor of Orlob awarding him damages. It is respectfully
submitted that this is a case where it should do so, inasmuch as it is abundantly clear that
Orlob was aware of his own actions in filing this case and deliberately concealed his
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cause of action — or indeed, any ownership of the stock of PCG — from the Bankruptcy
Court, then swore under oath that his statements and schedules were true and correct. See
Appellant's Addendum, Tab G., p. 29,30.
C.

THE DISTINCTION DRAWN BY ORLOB BETWEEN
"STANDING TO SUE'5 AND "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST"
CASES IS ILLUSORY.

Orlob wishes to draw a distinction between issues of "standing," which he
evidently concedes are jurisdictional, and "real party in interest," which he maintains is
not jurisdictional. He argues that, because the Jensens "filed . . . a responsive pleading
but failed to raise the defense that Orlob was not the real party in interest," any such
defense has been waived. (Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at 23.) As noted above,
however, no such defense was available as a purely factual matter because the Complaint
herein was filed on February 14,1991, while the bankruptcy statements and schedules
herein were not even filed until June 4,1992. See Appellant's Addendum G, p. 20.
Further, Orlob misconceives the Jensens argument, which is not simply that the instant
case should have been brought by the "real party in interest" — evidently, in Orlobfs own
view, the bankruptcy trustee — but that the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over OrloVs claims because he fraudulently concealed them from the bankruptcy court.
Orlob cites Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976) for the proposition that a
defendant's complete failure to object to a plaintiffs recovery of damages against him
individually, rather than his corporation, was waived because it was never raised at trial.
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Here, the defendants did raise before the Trial Court the issue of Orlobfs lack of standing
to pursue this case. Further, this case does not involve any issue whether the plaintiff has
sued the wrong party. The issue is whether plaintiff has any right to sue at all because of
his fraud on the bankruptcy court. Further, unlike Lewis, this case does not involve any
issue whether the plaintiff should be permitted to seek recovery against the defendants as
individuals or only against some entity not before the Court.
Orlob also cites Smith v. Boyer, 485 P.2d 664 (Utah 1971), as authority for his
argument that, where the issue is merely one of identifying the real party in interest,
standing is not jurisdictional. In dicta, the Boyer case suggested that the individual
defendant had no right to bring a replevin action in his own name for an automobile
owned by another, but pointed out that the issue of the defendant's standing had not been
raised in the replevin action and was thus "waived." Id. at 667. The Court does not
specifically address whether standing is jurisdictional and Boyer has not been
subsequently cited by appellate courts in Utah. Further, its dicta is at odds with
subsequent case law. See Heath Techna Corporation v. Sound Systems International,
Inc., 588 P.2d 169 (Utah 1978), where the Utah Supreme Court, raising the issue sua
sponte, and noting that the issue of standing was jurisdictional, held that a husband had
no standing to appeal the denial of his wife's motion for return of monies in a checking
account which she claimed belonged to her.
The Utah Supreme Court has identified three tests to determine the issue of
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standing. See, e.g., Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah
1986). First, the litigant can show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury
that gives him a personal stake int he outcome of the legal dispute. Second, the litigant
may have standing if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome and the issues are
unlikely to be raised otherwise. Third, a litigant may have standing if the issues are of
such great public importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of the
public interest. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). In Blodgett, the Court of Appeals determined that the appellant thus
failed the first test because she previously conveyed the property by quit claim deed.
Similarly, Orlob, in filing his bankruptcy, by operation of law conveyed his cause of
action to the bankruptcy trustee and, as noted in the Jensens' opening brief, because of his
misconduct in refusing to disclose the cause of action, that cause of action could not
"revest" in him upon conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, as in Blodgett,
Orlob had no "legally protected interest in the subject matter of the litigation" — his
cause of action herein.
Nor will either of the other two tests articulated by the Utah Supreme Court be of
any service to Orlob in establishing his standing in this case. Clearly, the bankruptcy
trustee would be "in a stronger position" to raise the issue of damages against the
Jensens. And Orlob has made no showing, under the third of the Court's tests, that the
issue of his recovery under the terms of a private contract are of such vital importance
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that the issue "ought to be decided in the furtherance of the public interest."
The above cases, read together with the additional cases cited in the Jensens1
opening brief, are persuasive for the propositions that (1) standing is a jurisdictional issue
which may be raised by a party at any time, or by the Court sua sponte; and (2) Orlob had
no standing to proceed with this case following his filing of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy and
his refusal to disclose his primary asset — his cause of action for damages herein. Simply
stated, his bankruptcyfraudprohibits his ability to proceed.
D.

THE FAILURE OF ORLOB TO SCHEDULE HIS CLAIMS
AGAINST THE JENSENS AS AN ASSET OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE IS JURISDICTIONAL.

Orlob suggests that his concealments of the very assets at issue herein in his
bankruptcy case is not jurisdictional, citing Pershing Park Villas Homeowners
Association v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 219 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2000). In
Pershing Park real property developers claimed that the failure of the insurance company
to defend had pushed them into bankruptcy. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit does not
make clear when that bankruptcy was filed, nor does it make clear whether the
developers reported the liability for the default judgment on their statements and
schedules. After summary judgment had been granted on the insurance company's failure
to defend, the insurance company did raise the issue of standing, citing Stein v. United
Artists Corporation, 691 F.2d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 1982). The District Court held issue had
been waived. The Ninth Circuit does not address the lower court's holding in light of
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Stein, but merely assumes that the standing issue raised by the insurance company was of
a non-jurisdictional nature. The Ninth Circuit does not decide whether the right of the
developers to sue was an asset of their bankruptcy estate, instead merely concluding that
the right to sue "may have passed to their bankruptcy estates by operation of the
bankruptcy laws." (Emphasis added.) In Pershing Park, there were none of the trappings
of fraud that permeate Orlob's case. Moreover, the Pershing Park case was built on a
claim that the insurance company's bad faith had caused the plaintiffs bankruptcy, and
the insurance company's fault was so palpable that it had been ruled upon by motion.
Any or all of the above factors may have influenced the ninth circuit in making its
rulings that were inconsistent with its own precedent and with the thrust of law on the
subject throughout the country. The holding in Pershing Park is not even supported by
the cases cited therein, including Stein. It is respectfully submitted that the Ninth Circuit's
holding cannot be harmonized with Stein and the numerous other cases cited in the
Jensens1 opening brief (see cases cited at Brief of Appellants, p 22), and thus Pershing
Park should not be followed.
Orlob suggests, wrongly, that before the trial court, the Jensens "chose to take a
different position, namely, that Orlob in fact had no interest in the combined agreement."
(Appellee's Brief at 29.) This is not, in fact, a "different position," but is entirely
consistent with the Jensens' argument herein. It is clearly true that Orlob had "no interest"
in the combined agreement, both because he breached that agreement and because he
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committed a fraud on the bankruptcy court.
E.

ORLOB'S ARGUMENT THAT ONCE A COURT HAS
JURISDICTION IT IS NEVER LOST IS WITHOUT MERIT.

Orlob asserts that, because the District Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over his
claims when this case was originally filed, the Court could not subsequently lose subject
matter jurisdiction, citing a Texas case. In Utah, however, even where a District Court
has original subject matter jurisdiction, if a party subsequently files for bankruptcy, the
Court may not exercise that jurisdiction to affect the bankruptcy estate. That was the
holding in Rogers v. Rogers, 671 P.2d 160 (Utah 1983). The Utah Supreme Court,
noting the "very broad jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy courts, determined that pursuant to
the wife's bankruptcy filing, "the United States District Court for the District of Utah has
jurisdiction over the appellant's bankruptcy proceedings and over all related civil matters
as well." Id. The court went on to determine that the property interests "became the
'estate1 of the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and therefore were subject to the jurisdiction
of the federal court.." The precise holding of the Court in Rogers is as follows:
We therefore hold that under the circumstances of the instant case, the
order of the state district court is ineffective to divide the property of the
appellant and respondent. The provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 541 and § 362
operate to stay the respondent's action in the trial court until such time that
property is made available for division because it is excluded from the
bankruptcy estate by the federal court or because the case is closed.
Id. at 165. Here, although Orlob's bankruptcy case is now closed, there is no asset
available for distribution to him because he failed to disclose that asset — his cause of
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action herein — and thus that asset never revested in him after bankruptcy. Notably,
Orlob does not argue that the cause of action reverted to him after the bankruptcy despite
his misconduct in concealing the cause of action herein. Any such argument would in any
event be contrary to law. (See cases cited in opening brief of Appellant at pp. 20-22.)
F.

THE APPELLANTS HEREIN MAKE NO CLAIM THAT
ORLOB IS FORECLOSED FROM RECOVERY BY THE
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL.

Orlob devotes a portion of his brief to arguing that the Jensens failed to preserve
any "judicial estoppel" argument in the Court below. On appeal, the Jensens make no
argument based upon judicial estoppel and, consequently, the doctrine of judicial
estoppel will not be further addressed herein.
m.

THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

Orlob disputes the assertion of the Jensens that the record supports the "fact that
the parties reached an understanding that payments to [Orlob] would be reduced
proportionately" after the Jensens negotiated with their physician clients for a reduction
of payments to them from six percent to five percent. The only issue with respect to the
statute of frauds is whether that agreement — or, indeed, the original agreement itself—
could be performed within one year. Two incontrovertible facts suggest that it could have
been performed within that time: (1) all of the physicians with whom the parties
contracted could have terminated their contracts with the Jensens prior to the expiration
of one year. If no replacement physicians were located, then all of the contractual
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obligations to Orlob would have terminated prior to the expiration of one year, taking the
Combined Agreement, and oral modifications thereto, out of the statute of frauds; and (2)
Orlob could have passed away prior to the expiration of one year, which would vitiate his
personal warranty of co-operation and his covenant not to compete. The District Court's
determination to the contrary is not in accord with the controlling case law, see Pasquin
v. Pasquin, 988 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Zion's Service Corp. v. Danielson, 366
P.2d 982 (Utah 1961).
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE
THAT ORLOB'S FAILURE TO INTRODUCE THE JENSENS
TO THE PAYSON PHYSICIANS AND HIS FAILURE TO
HONOR HIS WARRANTY THAT THE EXISTING
PHYSICIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO PAY A
SIX-PERCENT COMMISSION WERE MATERIAL
FAILURES WHICH EXCUSED ANY FURTHER
PERFORMANCE BY JENSENS UNDER THE COMBINED
AGREEMENT.

Orlobfs position on his breaches of the Combined Agreement have already been
substantially addressed in the opening brief of the Jensens. See Brief of Appellants, pp.
28-35. The Jensens do not challenge the finding of the Court that, with respect to Dr.
Peterson, that they elected an appropriate remedy by reducing the commissions which
would otherwise be payable to them, and thus to Orlob, by Dr. Peterson. They did not,
however, elect any such remedy with respect to the Payson physicians, nor did they elect
any remedy upon Orlob's failure to honor his warrant that the existing physicians would
be willing to pay a six-percent of collections. Nor did they elect any such remedy with
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respect to Dr. Hamilton. These failures of Orlob were material breaches of the contract
and they excused any further performance by the Jensens under the contract.
The issue of materiality is to be resolved by reference to whether the contract
provisions breached by Orlob were of "some importance" to the Jensens, and clearly,
those provisions were vital to the success of the business. The reduction of the
commissions payable by the physicians from six percent to five percent was made
necessary by the fact that Orlob did not honor his warranty to deliver the physicians
willing to pay six percent over the life of the contract. Obviously, this meant substantial
losses to Jensens on all "Orlob" contracts. See opening brief pp. 39-47.
Further, with respect to the provision of the Combined Agreement requiring Orlob
to "assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts to Jensens and assist Jensesn to maintain
the accounts over the life of the agreement," (Appellant's Addendum A, f 5) the Court
found as follows:
The Jensens repeatedly requested that Orlob introduce them to the
physicians as the new owners of the company. Orlob refused to do so,
advising the Jensens that if doctors who previously had been offered billing
at 4% by the Jensens learned that the Jensens were the new owners of the
company, it would affect their willingness to continue on their contracts to
pay 6%. The Jensens then advised at least one such doctor that they were
the new owners of the company, which created the very reaction Orlob
predicted, with the Salt Lake anesthesiologists threatening to terminate their
contracts.
(FF 15.) In other words, as in his bankruptcy case where Orlob determined to conceal his
assets, Orlob also attempted to conceal from his own physician-clients the fact that the
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Jensens had purchased their contracts.. The Jensens were, understandably, unwilling to
engage in any such subterfuge, and in any event Orlob's refusal even to introduce the
physicians to the Jensens cannot be harmonized with his obligations under the Combined
Agreement in paragraph 5 as set forth above. How could a physician account be
"transferred" to the Jensens in any reasonable fashion at all if the owner of PCG refused
"repeatedly" even to introduce the physician to the new owners of the Company? The
short answer is, it could not. The Court's ruling on this issue simply punishes the Jensens
for their honesty with the physican-clients, and rewards Orlob's dishonesty. Such a result
is more than simply unfair; rather, it goes to the materiality of Orlob's breach of his
obligation to assist the Jensens in the transfer of the accounts to them, a breach which
ultimately required the Jensens to approach the physicians on their own, with no help
from Orlob, and further required them to reduce the commissions payable by those
physicians or risk losing them. In short, Orlob's obligation to assist in the transfer of the
physician accounts to the Jensens, and his warranty to insure that "all listed
anesthesiologists accounts must be willing to pay 6% of total collections for services
rendered" (Brief of Appellant, Addendum A, ^ 8) were, at a bare minimum, "of some
importance" to the Jensens, and were thus material breaches of the contract on the part of
Orlob. See, e.g., Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.2d 235,242 (Utah 2002); Gohler v. Wood,
919 P.2d 561, 567 (Utah 1996); S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974).
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THIS CASE.
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The Jensens have dealt with this issue in full in their opening brief, see Brief of
Appellant at pp. 35-39, and will not further address the issue here.
VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 6
PERCENT WARRANTY OF ORLOB DID NOT EXTEND
OVER THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT.

As Orlob himself points out, the Combined Agreement provided that
"[notwithstanding the foregoing, Orlob warrants that all listed anesthesiologists accounts
must be willing to pay 6% of total collections for services rendered." (Appellee's Brief, p.
40-41; see Brief of Appellant, Addendum A, f 8.) He then goes on to suggest that this
language is somehow "ambiguous." It is not, and the Court made no such finding. The
Combined Agreement requires that Orlob take what ever actions are necessary to insure
that the physicians pay a six percent commission for whatever services are rendered. It is
a question of what the contract clearly provides. Under these circumstances, the District
Court's failure to enforce the contract pursuant to its express terms is incorrect as a matter
of law. See, e.g., Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647, 651-52 (Utah
Ct.App. 1993).
VII.

ORLOB MISCONCEIVES THE JENSENS ARGUMENT
REGARDING HIS LACK OF ENTITLEMENT TO
COMMISSION PAYMENTS.

Orlob asserts that the Jensens have inappropriately challenged the Court's Findings
of Fact Nos. 23 and 24. Both of these findings determine that Orlob is entitled to
50-percent of the commissions otherwise due to him. As noted in the opening brief of the
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Jensens, there is no evidence of any kind in the record to support this allocation. Orlob
claims 100% of the payments. The Jensens show that he is entitled to none, or, at best, a
small fraction of the payments. Here, the Court relied on the fact that the Combined
Agreement "does not state whether or how the commission payment should be divided
between PCG and David L. Orlob," and arrives at the fifty-percent figure based solely on
the absence of any instruction in the Combined Agreement. See FF 23,24, Brief of
Appellant, Addendum C. The Trial Court implicitly concluded that, because the
Combined Agreement refers to two parties — Professional's Control Group, Inc. and
David L. Orlob, individually — the Plaintiff Orlob must be entitled to one-half the
commission payments. This works as a matter of simple logic if there were no other
evidence. However, for the reasons set forth above and in the Jensen's opening brief, it is
respectfully submitted that Orlob is entitled to none of those commission payments.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be reversed.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2004.
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